A Theory of Sales Quotas with Limited Liability and Rent Sharing
AbstractSales quotas are a fixture of sales compensation plans and are often associated with a significant discrete bonus. This paper shows that, under certain assumptions about salesperson utility and the distribution of sales outcomes, the optimal compensation is a discrete bonus for meeting a sales quota. The results are similar when the assumption of agent risk neutrality is relaxed. The model has implications for many moral hazard problems where the agent has a liability limitation and job-specific skill. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 18 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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