Multiparty Competition, Founding Elections and Political Business Cycles in Africa
AbstractPolitical business cycle (PBC) theory and empirics typically assume that elections are competitive. Yet, as empirical work on PBCs turns increasingly to developing countries for evidence, this assumption becomes untenable. We propose and test two empirical hypotheses regarding PBCs: first, we should only see cycles when elections involve multiparty competition; secondly, we should see larger cycles in 'founding' elections. Using a new indicator of multiparty competition and macroeconomic data from Africa, we find strong support for our first hypothesis and moderate support for the second. These findings have implications for democratic transitions and the compatibility of economic and political reform in nascent democracies. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) in its journal Journal of African Economies.
Volume (Year): 12 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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