Making and breaking monetary policy rules: the experience of African countries
AbstractThis paper analyses the experience with rule-based monetary policy in African countries which have participated in monetary unions (CFA Franc Zone, Eastern African Currency Board and Rand Monetary Area). We show that African countries have generally lacked the domestic political institutions which would allow individual governments to tie their hands by establishing such rules. Monetary unions have proved to be an alternative possibility for credible commitment to sound macroeconomic policies, but only in cases where exit from a union is made costly by the provision of side-payments (or sanctions) in other areas of regional co-operation, and only when governance structures have been designed so as to maximise chances for the enforcement of monetary rules. We conclude by making suggestions about the design of African monetary unions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number WPS/1999-02.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1999
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