Uniformity Requirement and Political Accountability
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 89 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
voting theory; electoral accountability; centralization; uniformity; D72; H11; H70;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
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