Yardstick competition and political agency problems
AbstractWe examine how yardstick competition between jurisdictions affects the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We find that yardstick comparison can contribute both to disciplining and to selecting politicians. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (09)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- BELLEFLAMME, Paul & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2002. "Yardstick competition and political agency problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2002029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hindriks, 2001. "Yardstick Competition and Political Agency Problems," Working Papers 441, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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"Redistributive Public Employment,"
4553013, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006.
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- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
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