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Yardstick competition and political agency problems

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Author Info
Paul Belleflamme ()
Jean Hindriks ()

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Abstract

We examine how yardstick competition between jurisdictions affects the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We find that yardstick comparison can contribute both to disciplining and to selecting politicians. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-003-0297-8
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (09)
Pages: 155-169
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:155-169

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  1. Angelino Viceisza, 2007. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Rincke, Johannes, 2005. "Yardstick Competition and Policy Innovation," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-11, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ngo Van Long & Bodhisattva Sengupta, 2008. "Yardstick Competition, Corruption, and Electoral Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. SALMON, Pierre, 2003. "Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2003-03, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne. [Downloadable!]
  7. HINDRIKS, Jean & LOCKWOOD, Ben, 2004. "Centralization and political accountability," CORE Discussion Papers 2004052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  8. Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2008. "The Incentives to Cooperate in Local Public Goods Supply: A Repeated Game with Imperfect Monitoring," IDEI Working Papers 527, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Working Papers 2006-02, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Bischoff, Ivo, 2008. "Conditional Grants, Grant-Seeking and Welfare when there is Government Failure on the Subordinate Level," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-031, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Johannes Rincke, 2005. "Yardstick Competition and Policy Innovation," Public Economics 0511010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Economy Perspective," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 721, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Antonis Adam & Manthos D. Delis & Pantelis Kammas, 2008. "Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence from OECD Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Johannes Rincke, 2009. "Yardstick competition and public sector innovation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 337-361, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. HINDRIKS, Jean, 2004. "Inter-governmental competition: market solutions to political problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2004087, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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