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Yardstick competition and political agency problems

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Author Info
Paul Belleflamme ()
Jean Hindriks ()

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Abstract

We examine how yardstick competition between jurisdictions affects the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We find that yardstick comparison can contribute both to disciplining and to selecting politicians. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-003-0297-8
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (09)
Pages: 155-169
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:155-169

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  1. Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Working Papers 2006-02, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Johannes Rincke, 2005. "Yardstick Competition and Policy Innovation," Public Economics 0511010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Angelino Viceisza, 2007. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  5. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," Working Papers 2006-15, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
  6. Rincke, Johannes, 2005. "Yardstick Competition and Policy Innovation," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-11, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. SALMON, Pierre, 2003. "Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2003-03, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne. [Downloadable!]
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