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Redistributive Public Employment

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  • Easterly, William
  • Baqir, Reza
  • Alesina, Alberto

Abstract

Politicians may use “disguised†redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax-transfer schemes. First, we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis. Next, we provide evidence consistent with the prediction of the model, namely that in U.S. cities, politicians use public employment as such a redistributive device. We find that city employment is significantly higher in cities where income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher.

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File URL: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4553013/alesina_publicemployment.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 4553013.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Urban Economics
Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:4553013

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  1. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1997. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," NBER Working Papers 6009, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1993. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth," Papers 537, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  3. Wacziarg, Romain & Alesina, Alberto, 1998. "Openness, Country Size and Government," Scholarly Articles 4553014, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Alesina, Alberto & Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-90, May.
  5. Francisco Rodríguez, 2004. "Inequality, Redistribution, And Rent-Seeking," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16, pages 287-320, November.
  6. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December.
  7. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
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  1. My Texas NPR Debut at 11am PST tomorrow on "Green Jobs"
    by Matthew E. Kahn in Environmental and Urban Economics on 2009-06-02 02:26:00
  2. Matt Kahn on Green Jobs
    by John Whitehead in Environmental Economics on 2009-06-02 11:44:00
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