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Inequality, Redistribution, And Rent-Seeking

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Francisco Rodríguez

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Abstract

This paper presents a non-median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups and politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent-seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality and growth and provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Economics & Politics.

Volume (Year): 16 (2004)
Issue (Month): (November)
Pages: 287-320
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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:287-320

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dixit, A. & Helpman, E., 1996. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy," Papers 179, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
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  2. Tavares, Jose & Wacziarg, Romain, 2001. "How democracy affects growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(8), pages 1341-1378, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Benabou, R., 1996. "Unequal Societies," Working Papers 96-17, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Alesina, Alberto & Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-90, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 600-621, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Roland Bénabou, 1996. "Inequality and Growth," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, Volume 11, pages 11-92 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Campante, Felipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco G.H., 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3240, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March. [Downloadable!]
  3. Carl-Johan Dalgaard & Henrik Hansen & Theo Larsen, 2003. "Income Skewness, Redistribution and Growth: A Reconciliation," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-14, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1998. "Redistributive Public Employment," NBER Working Papers 6746, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Campante, Filipe, 2007. "Redistribution in a Model of Voting and Campaign Contributions," Working Paper Series rwp07-045, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  6. Rainald Borck, 2005. "Voting, Inequality, and Redistribution," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 503, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Robert J. Barro, 1999. "Inequality, Growth, and Investment," NBER Working Papers 7038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Haile, Daniel T., 2005. "Wealth Distribution, Lobbying and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers RP2005/21, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  9. Alberto Melo, 2003. "Colombia: Los problemas de competitividad de un país en conflicto," RES Working Papers 1002, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  10. Claudio Agostini & Phillip Brown, 2007. "Desigualdad geográfica en Chile," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Ilades-Georgetown University, Economics Department, vol. 22(1), pages 3-33, June. [Downloadable!]
  11. Gradstein, Mark, 2003. "The political economy of public spending on education, inequality, and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3162, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  12. Erwin Tiongson & Luiz de Mello, 2003. "Income Inequality and Redistributive Government Spending," IMF Working Papers 03/14, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  13. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2008. "A Second Chance at Success: A Political Economy Perspective," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-04-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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