Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory

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Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory

Author Info

Beaudry, P.
Poitevin, M.

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Paul Beaudry

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 9332.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:9332

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Related research
Keywords: information ; contracts;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Paul Beaudry & Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 302-35, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

HINDRIKS, Jean & LOCKWOOD, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare," CORE Discussion Papers 2005046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Jean Hindriks & Benjamin Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Working Papers 2006-02, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
- Hindricks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 5125, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Jean, HINDRIKS & Ben, Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation and Vote Welfare," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2005038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
- Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-03, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Levent Kockesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2009. "Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts," TÃSÄ°AD-KoÃ§ University Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0908, TUSIAD-Koc University Economic Research Forum. [Downloadable!]
AMBEC Stefan & POITEVIN Michel, 2008. "Marketing vs Engineering: Who Should Decide ?," Working Papers 08.22.266, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
ThŽophile, AZOMAHOU & Raouf, BOUCEKKINE & Phu, NUYEN VAN, 2003. "Energy consumption, technological progress and economic policy," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2003025, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2000. "Organizational Design of R & D Activities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0190, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D Activities," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-38, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
- Ambec, S. & Poitevin, M., 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D Activities," Cahiers de recherche 2001-12, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- AMBEC, Stefan & POITEVIN, Michel, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D Activities," Cahiers de recherche 2001-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
- Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D activities," CSEF Working Papers 60, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
Stefan Ambec & Philippe Barla, 2001. "A Theoretical Foundation of the Porter Hypothesis," CSEF Working Papers 54, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2002. "A theoretical foundation of the Porter hypothesis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 355-360, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Levent Koçkesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2008. "Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts," TÃSÄ°AD-KoÃ§ University Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0803., TUSIAD-Koc University Economic Research Forum. [Downloadable!]

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