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Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Paul Beaudry
Michel Poitevin
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This paper provides a unifying framework for studying renegotiation of contracts in the presence of asymmetric information. We show that interim renegotiation does not constrain the set of contracts attainable with full commitment, regardless of whether renegotiation offers are made by the informed or the uninformed agent. Ex post renegotiation, however, does constrain the set of attainable contracts. These constraints depend on the identity of the agent making the renegotiation offer. We then show how the theory of contract renegotiation can provide insights for organization theory. Specifically, we show how decentralization of decision making can be an optimal response to the threat of ex post renegotiation. Finally, we show that our framework can be used to analyse the trade-off between internal and external markets.
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Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics .
Volume (Year): 28 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 302-35
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:2:p:302-35Contact details of provider: Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4 Email: Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/ More information through EDIRC
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