This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Note on the Hybrid Equilibrium in the Besley-Smart Model

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Lockwood, Ben (University of Warwick and CEPR)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This note shows that there is always a non-empty set of parameter values for which the hybrid equilibrium in the Besley and Smart(2003) model is unstable in the sense of Cho and Kreps. This set may include all the parameter values for which a hybrid equilibrium exists. For these parameter values, it is shown that a fully separating equilibrium always exists, which is Cho-Kreps stable. In this equilibrium, the good incumbent distorts ?scal policy to signal his type. An implication is that equilibrium in their model is not (generically) unique.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/publications/twerp727.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 727.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:727

Contact details of provider:
Postal: CV4 7AL COVENTRY
Phone: +44 (0) 2476 523202
Fax: +44 (0) 2476 523032
Web page: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Margaret Nash).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Angelino Viceisza, 2007. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Fernanda Brollo, 2008. "Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians – Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program," Working Papers 336, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Fernanda Brollo, 2008. "Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians - Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-168, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A few items listed on IDEAS are over 2000 years old!

This page was last updated on 2009-12-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.