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Constitutional Determinants of Government Spending

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  • Guido Tabellini

Abstract

This paper surveys some recent literature on fiscal policy and comparative politics. Economic policy is viewed as the outcome of a game with multiple-principals and multiple-agents. Opportunistic politicians bargain over policy. Rational voters hold them accountable through retrospective voting. Political institutions determine the rules for legislative bargaining and for electing politicians to office. The questions asked are: how do alternative electoral rules and alternative regime types shape the size of government, the composition of spending, the performance of politicians in terms of effort or corruption, the features of electoral cycles. The paper discusses both theory and evidence, and concludes with some speculations about directions for future research.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 265.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_265

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Keywords: Comparative politics; corruption; elections; fiscal policy;

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References

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  1. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University 121, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659 Elsevier.
  3. Myerson Roger B., 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 118-132, January.
  4. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December.
  5. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, . "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University 100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  6. Seabright, Paul, 1994. "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 889, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Andreas Kyriacou & Oriol Roca sagalés, 2009. "Fiscal descentralization and the quality of government: evidence from panel data," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, IEF, vol. 189(2), pages 131-155, June.
  2. Oto-Peralías, Daniel & Romero-Ávila, Diego & Usabiaga, Carlos, 2013. "Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 205-231.
  3. Maria Rosaria Alfano & Anna Laura Baraldi & Claudia Cantabene, 2014. "The Effect of the Decentralization Degree on Corruption: A New Interpretation," Working papers, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica 4, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
  4. Lessmann, Christian & Markwardt, Gunther, 2008. "One size fits all? Decentralization, corruption, and the monitoring of bureaucrats," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics 14/08, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  5. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
  6. Daniel Oto Peralías & Diego Romero-Ávila & Carlos Usabiaga, 2013. "Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficit?," EcoMod2013, EcoMod 5690, EcoMod.
  7. Hagen, Jürgen von, 2005. "Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 149, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Jürgen von Hagen, 2002. "Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(3), pages 263-284.

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