Corruption and Social Interaction: Evidence from China
AbstractWe explore theoretically and empirically whether social interaction, including local and global interaction, influences the incidence of corruption. We first present an interaction-based model on corruption that predicts that the level of corruption is positively associated with social interaction. Then we empirically verify the theoretical prediction using within-country evidence at the province-level in China during 1998 to 2007. Panel data evidence clearly indicates that social interaction has a statistically significantly positive effect on the corruption rate in China. Our findings, therefore, underscore the relevance of social interaction in understanding corruption.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2011.09.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Corruption; Social Interaction; China;
Other versions of this item:
- Dong, Bin & Torgler, Benno, 2012. "Corruption and social interaction: Evidence from China," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 932-947.
- Bin Dong & Benno Torgler, 2010. "Corruption and Social Interaction: Evidence from China," CREMA Working Paper Series 2010-22, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Bin Dong & Benno Torgler, 2010. "Corruption and Social Interaction: Evidence from China," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 261, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2011-02-12 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-DEV-2011-02-12 (Development)
- NEP-LAW-2011-02-12 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-02-12 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-TRA-2011-02-12 (Transition Economics)
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- Guenther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2013. "Corruption in Russia," Discussion Paper Series 22, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Apr 2013.
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