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Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective

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Author Info
Jeffrey Milyo
David Primo
Timothy Groseclose

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Abstract

There is a vast empirical literature on the allocation of corporate PAC contributions in Congressional elections and the influence that these contributions have on the policy-making process. The attention given to PAC contributions is far in excess of their actual importance. Corporate PAC contributions account for about 10% of Congressional campaign spending and major corporations allocate far more money to lobbying or philanthropy than their affiliated PACs make in contributions.

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File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=bap
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Business and Politics.

Volume (Year): 2 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages:
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:2:y:2000:i:1:n:5

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Web page: http://www.bepress.com/bap

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  1. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2002. "Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 9064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. John M. de Figueiredo & Charles M. Cameron, 2006. "Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-156, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2008. "Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6898, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. David Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004. "State Campaign Finance Laws and the Turnout Decision," Working Papers 0410, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  5. Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Access Fees in Politics," Working Papers 0903, University of Miami, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda & Prachi Mishra, 2007. "Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?," IZA Discussion Papers 3183, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  7. Michael Ensley, 2009. "Individual campaign contributions and candidate ideology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 221-238, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  9. Cotton, Christopher, 2007. "Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access," MPRA Paper 1842, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2005. "Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 467-482, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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