Political Competition, Political Donations, Economic Policy and Growth
AbstractGreater political competition reduces the extent of rent-seeking or resource diversion by politicians in government. However, the potency of this effect depends on whether or not there are limits on donations to candidates standing for election, and on the objectives of donors themselves. Data from the US states suggest that the corruption-political competition gradient is stronger under laissez-faire regimes. Consistent with our notion of 'weakly benign' donors, limits are associated with better policies and stronger growth performance at low levels of political competition, whilst laissez-faire is preferred when political competition is high.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 13/21.
Date of creation: Aug 2013
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political competition; political donations; rent-seeking; economic policy; growth;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-09-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2013-09-06 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-09-06 (Positive Political Economics)
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