The Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth
AbstractThe absence of limits on own-source campaign contributions is widely thought to give wealthy candidates an advantage in congressional elections. We employ a unique data set on the wealth of House incumbents running for reelection in 1992. We find that wealthy incumbents do not raise or spend more campaign funds and do not win greater vote shares in their reelection bids. Further, incumbent wealth does not deter high-quality challengers. Copyright 1999 by the University of Chicago.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 42 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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