What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?
AbstractMuch empirical work on Congressional elections implicitly assumes that candidates are vote-maximizers; this may be a fair assumption for challengers, but it is not a good description of incumbent behavior. I present a general intertemporal utility maximizing model of candidate behavior, which includes vote-maximization as a special case. I then demonstrate that these models have important consequences for both the design and interpretation of empirical work. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 109 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9822, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
- Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "How prices matter in politics: the returns to campaign advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 357-377, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.