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What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?

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  • Jeffrey Milyo

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Abstract

Much empirical work on Congressional elections implicitly assumes that candidates are vote-maximizers; this may be a fair assumption for challengers, but it is not a good description of incumbent behavior. I present a general intertemporal utility maximizing model of candidate behavior, which includes vote-maximization as a special case. I then demonstrate that these models have important consequences for both the design and interpretation of empirical work. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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  • Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9822, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  • Handle: RePEc:tuf:tuftec:9822
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey Milyo, 2013. "Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition: Towards More Policy Relevant Research," Working Papers 1344, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    2. Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "How prices matter in politics: the returns to campaign advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 357-377, September.
    3. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
    4. Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Kallias, Konstantinos & Newton, David & Tzeremes, Nickolaos, 2016. "Political connections and IPO underpricing: An efficiency problem," MPRA Paper 69427, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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