This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Jeffords Effect

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jayachandran, Seema

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In May 2001, Senator James Jeffords left the Republican Party and tipped control of the U.S. Senate to the Democrats. This paper uses the surprise event to demonstrate what I term the "Jeffords effect": changes in the political landscape have large effects on the market value of firms. I use a firm's soft-money donations to the national parties as the measure of how the firm aligns itself politically. In this event study, a firm lost .8 percent of market capitalization the week of Jeffords's switch for every $250,000 it gave to the Republicans in the previous election cycle. On the basis of the point estimates, the stock price gain associated with Democratic donations is smaller than the loss associated with Republican donations, but the estimates are consistent with the effects being equal and opposite. The results withstand several robustness checks, and the effects appear to persist over time.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 49 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 397-425
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2006:v:49:i:2:p:397-425

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637
Fax: (773) 753-0811
Email:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/order1.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Baron, David P, 1989. "Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 45-72, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-50, October.
  4. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  6. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., 2003. "Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Federico Cingano & Paolo Pinotti, 2009. "Politicians at work. The private returns and social costs of political connections," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 709, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2008. "Corporate Campaign Contributions as a Predictor for Abnormal Stock Returns after Presidential Elections," Working Papers 2008-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  3. Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 6273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," Working Paper Series rwp07-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  5. Nowook Park & Rohini Somanathan, 2004. "Patronage in public administration: Presidential connections, position assignments and the performance of Korean public prosecutors, 1992-2000," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-02, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
  6. Brian Knight, 2004. "Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election," NBER Working Papers 10333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Philip Hersch & Jeffry Netter & Christopher Pope, 2008. "Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital?," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 395-405, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Stijn Claessens & Erik Feijen & Luc Laeven, 2006. "Does Campaign Finance imply Political Favors?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-002/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  9. Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2006. "Party Influence in Congress and the Economy," NBER Working Papers 12751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Aris, Stouraitis, 2008. "The helping hand, the lazy hand, or the grabbing hand? Central vs. local government shareholders in publicly listed firms in China," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-11, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.