Congressional Committees as Reputation-building Mechanisms
AbstractInterest groups cannot enforce contracts with legislators to work in their favor since fee-for-service agreements would be considered bribery. When such contracts are not available, a system of specialized, standing committees can provide a second-best way to maximize contributions, since such a system facilitates repeated interactions and reputational development between PACs and members of the relevant committees. Using data on PAC contributions by competing financial services interests to members of the House Banking Committee, we find evidence consistent with key implications of our model of committees as reputational-development devises. We then interpret important episodes in the evolution and development of the committee system during the twentieth century from the perspective of our theory. We focus on the revolt against House Speaker Cannon, which resulted in the birth of the modern committee system, and the post-Watergate reforms. We also consider broader implications of this approach for analyzing term limits, corruption, and party strength. JEL classifications: D72, D78, G28.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Business and Politics.
Volume (Year): 2 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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- Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
- John M. de Figueiredo, 2011. "Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 17171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tahoun, Ahmed, 2014. "The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 86-110.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
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