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The Jeffords Effect Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Seema Jayachandran
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Online Papers with number
297.
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Date of creation: 15 Jul 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:uclaol:297Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998.
"Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998.
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees ,"
CRSP working papers
349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1996.
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress:Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees ,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
126, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
[Downloadable!] Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, .
"Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services', Political Action Committees ,"
CRSP working papers
465, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Baron, David P, 1989.
"Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 45-72, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997.
"Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do? ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-50, October.
Raymond Fisman, 2001.
"Estimating the Value of Political Connections ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stratmann, Thomas, 1998.
"The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything? ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., 2003.
"Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics? ,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003.
"Why Is There So Little Money in Politics? ,"
NBER Working Papers
9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stratmann, Thomas, 2002.
"Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Pande, Rohini, 2007.
"Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries ,"
Working Paper Series
rwp07-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
[Downloadable!]
Nowook Park & Rohini Somanathan, 2004.
"Patronage in public administration: Presidential connections, position assignments and the performance of Korean public prosecutors, 1992-2000 ,"
Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers
04-02, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
[Downloadable!]
Brian Knight, 2004.
"Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election ,"
NBER Working Papers
10333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Knight*, Brian, 2007.
"Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 389-409, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Knight, Brian, 2006.
"Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 751-773, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Pande, Rohini, 2007.
"Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Federico Cingano & Paolo Pinotti, 2009.
"Politicians at work. The private returns and social costs of political connections ,"
Temi di discussione (Economic working papers)
709, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.
[Downloadable!]
Philip Hersch & Jeffry Netter & Christopher Pope, 2008.
"Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital? ,"
Atlantic Economic Journal ,
International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 395-405, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stijn Claessens & Erik Feijen & Luc Laeven, 2006.
"Does Campaign Finance imply Political Favors? ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
06-002/2, Tinbergen Institute.
[Downloadable!]
Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2008.
"Corporate Campaign Contributions as a Predictor for Abnormal Stock Returns after Presidential Elections ,"
Working Papers
2008-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
[Downloadable!]
Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2006.
"Party Influence in Congress and the Economy ,"
NBER Working Papers
12751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cheung, Yan-Leung & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Aris, Stouraitis, 2008.
"The helping hand, the lazy hand, or the grabbing hand? Central vs. local government shareholders in publicly listed firms in China ,"
CEI Working Paper Series
2008-11, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
[Downloadable!]
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