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The 2010 Midterm Election for the US House of Representatives

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  • Hibbs, Douglas A.

Abstract

The number of House seats won by the president's party at midterm elections is well explained by three pre-determined or exogenous variables: (1) the number of House seats won by the in-party at the previous on-year election, (2) the vote margin of the in-party's candidate at the previous presidential election, and (3) the average growth rate of per capita real disposable personal income during the congressional term. Given the partisan division of House seats following the 2008 on-year election, President Obama's margin of victory in 2008, and the weak growth of per capita real income during the first 6 quarters of the 111th Congress, the Democrat's chances of holding on to a House majority by winning at least 218 seats at the 2010 midterm election will depend on real income growth in the 3rd quarter of 2010. The data available at this writing indicate the that Democrats will win 211 seats, a loss of 45 from the 2008 on-year result that will put them in the minority for the 112th Congress.

Suggested Citation

  • Hibbs, Douglas A., 2010. "The 2010 Midterm Election for the US House of Representatives," MPRA Paper 25918, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:25918
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas Hibbs, 2000. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 149-180, July.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(2), pages 373-398, June.
    3. Tufte, Edward R., 1975. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 812-826, September.
    4. Grier, Kevin B & McGarrity, Joseph P, 2002. "Presidential Party, Incumbency, and the Effects of Economic Fluctuations on House Elections, 1916-1996," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 143-162, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Auberger, 2021. "Vote, popularity, economic conditions and French legislative elections [Vote, popularité, conditions économiques et élections législatives françaises]," Working Papers hal-03480853, HAL.
    2. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2019. "Var det fortsat ”the economy, stupid!” i 2016 og 2018? [Was it still "the economy, stupid!" in 2016 and 2018?]," MPRA Paper 97297, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Antoine Auberger, 2021. "Vote, popularity, unemployment and French presidential elections [Vote, popularité, chômage et élections présidentielles françaises]," Working Papers hal-03480855, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    US House of Representatives; 2010 election; economics and elections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
    • E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • Y80 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines - - - Related Disciplines
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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