The 2010 Midterm Election for the US House of Representatives
AbstractThe number of House seats won by the president's party at midterm elections is well explained by three pre-determined or exogenous variables: (1) the number of House seats won by the in-party at the previous on-year election, (2) the vote margin of the in-party's candidate at the previous presidential election, and (3) the average growth rate of per capita real disposable personal income during the congressional term. Given the partisan division of House seats following the 2008 on-year election, President Obama's margin of victory in 2008, and the weak growth of per capita real income during the first 6 quarters of the 111th Congress, the Democrat's chances of holding on to a House majority by winning at least 218 seats at the 2010 midterm election will depend on real income growth in the 3rd quarter of 2010. The data available at this writing indicate the that Democrats will win 211 seats, a loss of 45 from the 2008 on-year result that will put them in the minority for the 112th Congress.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 25918.
Date of creation: 22 Sep 2010
Date of revision:
US House of Representatives; 2010 election; economics and elections;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
- Y80 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines - - - Related Disciplines
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-10-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-10-30 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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