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Election Finance Regulation in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Canada and the U.S

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Author Info
Filip Palda (Ecole nationale d'administration publique in Montreal)

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Abstract

Election finances are usually lightly regulated in emerging democracies. As these democracies mature they seek to impose campaign spending limits, limits on contributions, and disclosure laws. The present paper reviews the experience with such laws in the United States and Canada and contrasts the public interest arguments for such laws with research emerging which suggests that campaign finance law may be used to stifle electoral competition. The paper surveys major research in the field and focuses particular attention on reporting and disclosure regulations. These regulations can impose costs on new candidates which cripple their ability to compete with established candidates. The paper also highlights the potential dangers of limiting what independent citizens' groups may spend during elections.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0111/0111010.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0111010.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 14 Nov 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0111010

Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 44 ; figures: included. PDF document may be viewed or printed
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Campaign finance; spending limits; campaign contributions; electoral competition;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eckard, E Woodrow, Jr, 1991. "Competition and the Cigarette TV Advertising Ban," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 119-33, January.
  2. Haas-Wilson, Deborah, 1989. "Strategic regulatory entry deterrence An empirical test in the ophthalmic market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 339-352, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bender, Bruce, 1988. "An Analysis of Congressional Voting on Legislation Limiting Congressional Campaign Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(5), pages 1005-21, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Nelson, Phillip, 1976. "Political Information," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 315-36, August.
  5. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1990. "The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 103-31, April.
  6. Filip Palda, 2001. "The Economics of Election Campaign Spending Limits," Public Economics 0111011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dan Usher, 1982. "The Benefits and Cost of Firm-Specific Investment Grants: A Study of Five Federal Programs," Working Papers 511, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  8. Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1978. "The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 245-57, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Palda, Filip, 1992. "The Determinants of Campaign Spending: The Role of the Government Jackpot," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(4), pages 627-38, October.
  11. Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: A Natural Experiment Approach," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9806, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]
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