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An Analysis of Congressional Voting on Legislation Limiting Congressional Campaign Expenditures

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Author Info
Bender, Bruce
Abstract

Congressional voting on proposed floor amendments concerned solely with setting the level of the election campaign expenditure ceiling provision of the House Administration Committee's broad campaign finance reform bill of 1974 is analyzed for consistency with either the public-interest or economic theories of regulation. The benefit or cost to the individual congressman of a given ceiling is defined as the implied increase or decrease in his probability of reelection under the ceiling. Logit regression analysis provides the preponderant support for the economic theory of regulation by indicating that the likelihood of voting for a given ceiling varies directly with the implied change in reelection probability under the ceiling and is quite sensitive to the implied change. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 96 (1988)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 1005-21
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:96:y:1988:i:5:p:1005-21

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  1. John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Filip Palda, 2001. "Election Finance Regulation in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Canada and the U.S," Public Economics 0111010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Filip Palda, 2002. "Campaign Finance: An Introduction to the Field," Public Economics 0209005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Thomas Evans, 2007. "An empirical test of why incumbents adopt campaign spending limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 437-456, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Filip Palda, 2001. "The Economics of Election Campaign Spending Limits," Public Economics 0111011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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