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Are Campaign Contributions a Form of Speech? Evidence from Recent US House Elections

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Author Info
 Dharmapala, Dhammika
Palda, Filip

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Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of the sources of candidates' campaign funding on their electoral outcomes, with particular emphasis on whether candidates who rely on a narrow base of funding suffer adverse electoral consequences. An extensive dataset consisting of over 650,000 contributions to House candidates in elections from 1980 to 1992 is used. The results reveal a negative relationship between the concentration of contributions and voteshare for open seat candidates and challengers. This finding appears to have significant implications for some of the empirical premises underlying the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision. At the very least, it represents an important stylized fact about US elections that is robust over 1980-92 period. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 112 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
Pages: 81-114
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:112:y:2002:i:1-2:p:81-114

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dharmapala, Dhammika, 1999. "Comparing tax expenditures and direct subsidies: the role of legislative committee structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 421-454, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: A Natural Experiment Approach," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9806, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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  7. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Christoph Vanberg, 2005. "“One Man, One Dollar”? Examining the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits," Public Economics 0512001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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