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“One Man, One Dollar”? Examining the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits

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Author Info
Christoph Vanberg (Max Planck Institute of Economics)

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Abstract

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limits imposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Such contribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption, the second is that they democratize the financing of campaigns by equalizing the relative influence of donors. According to the latter argument, an equalization of donor influence is desirable because it causes campaign resources to more accurately reflect public support for candidates and their political ideas. I construct a formal model to illustrate this equalization argument in support of contribution limits. The analysis calls attention to a number of implicit assumptions underlying the corresponding money primary analogy for campaign fund-raising. The central assumption is that a candidate’s reliance on large contributions is an indicator of negative characteristics not revealed through her campaign communication. The model also suggests a method for testing this assumption, as it implies a negative relationship between a candidate’s reliance on large contributions and her electoral success. Using data on elections to the House of Representatives between 1990 and 2002, I find no evidence that such a negative relationship exists. This empirical result casts doubt on the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0512001.

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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0512001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 49
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Elections Campaign Contributions Speech Signaling Campaign Advertising Corruption Inequality Equality First Amendment Buckley

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H - Public Economics

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  1. Dharmapala, Dhammika & Palda, Filip, 2002. " Are Campaign Contributions a Form of Speech? Evidence from Recent US House Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 81-114, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. John E. Roemer, 2004. "Political Equilibrium with Private or/and Public Campaign Finance: A Comparison of Institutions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm349, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(4), pages 999-1017, October.
  4. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
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    • Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 628-655, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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