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Lobbying, campaign contributions, and electoral competition

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  • Le, Thanh
  • Yalcin, Erkan

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of lobby groups on electoral competition and equilibrium policy outcomes employing a ‘money for policy favours’ model of lobbying. Our results show that when a lobby group seeks to influence an electoral outcome, it will make a financial contribution to only one political party whose policy is closely aligned to its own ideal policy. When misappropriation of campaign funds occurs, political parties that divert more funds for personal gain stand on more independent platforms and require larger contributions from lobby groups. Greater electoral competition could reduce policy distortions but this, in turn, sparks more intense lobbying thereby increasing the scope of misappropriation of funds. In the case of multiple lobbying, political parties either demand different levels of campaign contributions or leave them with different levels of satisfaction.

Suggested Citation

  • Le, Thanh & Yalcin, Erkan, 2018. "Lobbying, campaign contributions, and electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 559-572.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:559-572
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.05.003
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thanh Le & Erkan Yalcin, 2023. "Endogenous expropriation and political competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 313-332, March.
    2. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    3. Thanh Le & Erkan Yalcin, 2023. "Lobbying, political competition and the welfare effect of campaign contribution tax," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 70(2), pages 158-179, May.
    4. Thorsten Drautzburg & Igor Livshits & Mark L. J. Wright, 2022. "Polarized Contributions but Convergent Agendas," Working Papers 22-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    5. Deepti Kohli & Meeta Keswani Mehra, "undated". "Impact of Electoral Competition, Swing Voters and Interest Group Lobbying on Strategic Determination of Equilibrium Policy Platforms," Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Discussion Papers 20-02, Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
    6. Cohle, Zachary & Ortega, Alberto, 2022. "Life of the party: The polarizing effect of foreign direct investment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    7. Sarbajit Chaudhuri & Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar & Sushobhan Mahata, 2022. "Cronyism and corruption in India: A game theoretic analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 2607-2618, September.
    8. Kohli, Deepti & Mehra, Meeta Keswani, 2023. "Impact of electoral competition, swing voters and interest groups on equilibrium policy platforms: Exploring the strategic forces at work," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 60-75.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Special interest politics; Lobbying; Political competition; Campaign contributions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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