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Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform

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Author Info
Matthias Dahm () (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Nicolás Porteiro () (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)

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Abstract

Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to “buy favors”, this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest groups achieve influence by providing political decision makers with policy relevant information, we also assume that lobbies engage in non-negligible informational lobbying. We focus on a single political decision to be taken and offer a simple model in which the optimal influence strategy is a mixture of both lobbying instruments. Our main result is to show that campaign finance reform may have important side-effects: It may deter informational lobbying so that less policy relevant information is available and as a result political decisions become less efficient.

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File URL: http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ0615.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2006
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía in its series Working Papers with number 06.15.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:06.15

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Related research
Keywords: party and candidate financing lobbying interest groups experts information transmission contributions influence political decision making process.

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Austen-Smith, David, 1998. "Allocating Access for Information and Contributions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 277-303, October.
  2. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure," Working Papers 06.14, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(4), pages 999-1017, October.
  4. Zhihao Yu, 2003. "Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence," Carleton Economic Papers 03-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Matejka, M. & Onderstal, S. & De Waegenaere, A., 2002. "The effectiveness of caps on political lobbying," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  9. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 628-655, June. [Downloadable!]
  10. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., 2003. "Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 162-189, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Stephen Ansolobehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cotton, Christopher, 2007. "Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access," MPRA Paper 1842, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Biased Contests," Working Papers 06.21, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008. "Biased contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 55-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008. "Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 531-559, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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