This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Biased Contests Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Matthias Dahm () (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Nicolás Porteiro () (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
We examine the effects of providing more accurate information to a political decision-maker who is lobbied by competing interests. Conventional wisdom holds that such a bias in the direction of the correct decision improves the efficiency of government. We provide a formal definition of bias which is derived from the same fundamentals that give rise to a contest model of lobbying. Efficiency of government is measured by both the probability of taking the correct decision and the amount of social waste associated to lobbying activities. We present a benchmark model in which increasing the bias always improves the efficiency of government under both criteria. However, this result is fragile in the sense that reasonable alternative assumptions in the micro-foundations lead to slightly different models in which -due to different strategic effects of bias- under either criterion there is no guarantee that more accurate information improves government.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
06.21.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:06.21Contact details of provider: Postal: Carretera de Utrera km.1, 41013 Sevilla Phone: + 34 954 34 8913 Fax: + 34 954 34 9339 Email: Web page: http://www.upo.es/econ/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Rocío Fernández).
Keywords: Endogenous Contests ; Contest Success Function ; Information provision ; Other versions of this item:
Article Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008.
"Biased contests ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 55-67, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002.
"Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies ,"
Keele Economics Research Papers
KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: J. Amegashie, 2006.
"A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 135-144, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006.
"Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform ,"
Working Papers
06.15, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Matthias Dahm & Nicolas Porteiro, 2005.
"Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform ,"
Discussion Papers
1408, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008.
"Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform ,"
Journal of the European Economic Association ,
MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 1057-1077, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987.
"Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
452, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992.
"Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction ,"
Papers
9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Other versions:
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991.
"Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993.
"Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000.
"Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 22-43, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006.
"Informational lobbying and political contributions ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996.
"The all-pay auction with complete information (*) ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
Other versions:
Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper de, 1995.
"The All-pay Auction with Complete Information ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995.
"The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information ,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992.
"The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information ,"
Papers
8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991.
"The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990.
"The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information ,"
Papers
9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993.
"The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates ,"
Papers
10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Other versions:
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993.
"The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates ,"
Papers
9368, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993.
"The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1039, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006.
"Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure ,"
Working Papers
06.14, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Matthias Dahm & Nicolas Porteiro, 2005.
"Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure ,"
Discussion Papers
1409, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008.
"Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure ,"
Social Choice and Welfare ,
Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 531-559, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Luis Corchon & Matthias Dahm, 2007.
"Foundations For Contest Success Functions ,"
Economics Working Papers
we070401, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999.
"Auctioning Entry into Tournaments ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992.
" A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-50, April.
Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996.
"Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts ,"
Discussion Papers
1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994.
"Modelling rent-seeking contests ,"
European Journal of Political Economy ,
Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003.
"The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Matthias Dahm & Nicolas Porteiro, 2005.
"A Micro- Foundation for Non-Deterministic Contests of the Logit Form ,"
Discussion Papers
1410, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Luis Corchon & Matthias Dahm, 2007.
"Foundations For Contest Success Functions ,"
Economics Working Papers
we070401, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to register as authors .
This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .