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Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion

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Author Info

  • Christopher Cotton

    (Department of Economics, University of Miami)

  • Arnaud Dellis

    (Department of Economics, Universite Laval and CIRPEE)

Abstract

This paper challenges the prevailing view in the literature that informational lobbying is socially beneficial. Key to our analysis is the fact that policymakers are constrained on the number of issues they can address, which forces them to prioritize issues. Under reasonable conditions, interest groups advocating less-salient reforms produce information, inducing policymakers to prioritize those reforms instead of more-salient ones. Such distortion of the policy agenda reduces social welfare. Our story is consistent with empirical accounts of the lobbying process.

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File URL: http://bus.miami.edu/_assets/files/repec/WP2013-03.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Miami, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013-03.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 15 Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mia:wpaper:2013-03

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Related research

Keywords: Informational lobbying; agenda setting; information collection; persuasion;

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References

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  1. A. Rubinstein & J. Glazer, . "Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s7, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  2. Rasmusen, Eric, 1993. " Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 899-913, December.
  3. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2000. "Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  4. Matthias Dahm & Nicolas Porteiro, 2005. "Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure," Discussion Papers 1409, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access," Working Papers 0901, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  6. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2000. "Lobbying Legislatures," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  7. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
  8. Demange, Gabrielle & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "A communication game on electoral platforms," TSE Working Papers 09-112, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  9. Austen-Smith, David, 1998. "Allocating Access for Information and Contributions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 277-303, October.
  10. Arnaud Dellis, 2009. "The Salient Issue of Issue Salience," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 203-231, 04.
  11. Potters, J.J.M. & Winden, F. van, 1992. "Lobbying and asymmetric information," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-223989, Tilburg University.
  12. Lagerlof, Johan, 1997. "Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 615-637, September.
  13. Christopher Cotton, 2010. "Pay-to-Play Politics: Informational lobbying and campaign finance reform when contributions buy access," Working Papers 2010-22, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  14. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2012. "The War of Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 707-734.
  15. Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2012. "When do simple policies win?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 621-637, April.
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