Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives
AbstractThis paper presents time-series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1990. The empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time. The authors find no evidence of economically significant last-term effects on voting behavior, nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns. The most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid, suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 76 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- A Abigail Payne, 2001.
"The Effects of Congressional Appropriation Committee Membership on the Distribution of Federal Research Funding to Universities,"
- A. Abigail Payne, 2003. "The Effects of Congressional Appropriation Committee Membership on the Distribution of Federal Research Funding to Universities," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 325-345, April.
- Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996.
"Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73373, Tilburg University.
- Reed, W Robert, et al, 1998.
" The Relationship between Congressional Spending and Tenure with an Application to Term Limits,"
Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 85-104, January.
- W. Reed & D. Schansberg & James Wilbanks & Zhen Zhu, 1998. "The relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 85-104, January.
- Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M, 2004.
"Term Limits and Electoral Accountability,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael Smart & Daniel Sturm, 2004. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Economic History Working Papers 20283, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
- Michael Smart & Daniel M. Sturm, 2006. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEP Discussion Papers dp0770, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Michael Smart & Daniel M. Sturm, 2006. "Term limits and electoral accountability," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19771, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Timothy Besley & Valentino Larcinese, 2005.
"Working or shirking?: a closer look at MPs’ expenses and parliamentary attendance,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
3609, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Timothy Besley & Valentino Larcinese, 2005. "Working or Shirking?A Closer Look at MPs’ Expenses and Parliamentary Attendance," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 15, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Fredriksson, Per & Mamun, Khawaja, 2009. "Gubernatorial Reputation and Vertical Tax Externalities: All Smoke, No Fire?," Working Papers 2009002, Sacred Heart University, John F. Welch College of Business.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.