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The Effects of Congressional Appropriation Committee Membership on the Distribution of Federal Research Funding to Universities

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  • A. Abigail Payne

Abstract

Does congressional representation of a university affect the distribution of research funding to universities? This article studies two types of congressional representation: district representation, reflecting interests related to the politician's constituents, and alma mater affiliation, reflecting the politician's personal interests. I find that both types of representation matter and lobbying efforts by public and private universities may differ. Thus this article suggests politics plays a role in diverting funding that might be given to other institutions based under a more objective process, reducing the potential effectiveness of the funding on research activities. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 325-345

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:2:p:325-345

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  1. Goff, Brian L & Grier, Kevin B, 1993. " On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 5-20, June.
  2. Glenn Parker & Suzanne Parker, 1998. "The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 117-129, April.
  3. Connolly, Laura S., 1997. "Does external funding of academic research crowd out institutional support?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 389-406, June.
  4. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  5. Lazear, Edward P, 1997. "Incentives in Basic Research," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages S167-97, January.
  6. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
  7. Parker, Glenn R & Parker, Suzanne L, 1998. " The Economic Organization of Legislatures and How It Affects Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 117-29, April.
  8. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  9. Saving, Jason L, 1997. " Human Capital, Committee Power and Legislative Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 301-16, September.
  10. Lott, John R, Jr & Bronars, Stephen G, 1993. " Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 125-49, June.
  11. James D. Adams & Zvi Griliches, 1996. "Research Productivity in a System of Universities," NBER Working Papers 5833, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. A. Abigail Payne & Aloysius Siow, 1998. "Estimating the Effects of Federal Research Funding on Universities using Alumni Representation on Congressional Appropriations Committees," Working Papers siow-99-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  13. Frank R. Lichtenberg, 2001. "The Allocation of Publicly Funded Biomedical Research," NBER Chapters, in: Medical Care Output and Productivity, pages 565-590 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1162-76, December.
  15. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Philippe Aghion & Mathias Dewatripont & Caroline M. Hoxby & Andreu Mas-Colell & André Sapir, 2009. "The Governance and Performance of Research Universities: Evidence from Europe and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 14851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Stratmann, Thomas, 2013. "The effects of earmarks on the likelihood of reelection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 341-355.

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