The Effects of Congressional Appropriation Committee Membership on the Distribution of Federal Research Funding to Universities
AbstractDoes congressional representation of a university affect the distribution of research funding to universities? This article studies two types of congressional representation: district representation, reflecting interests related to the politician's constituents, and alma mater affiliation, reflecting the politician's personal interests. I find that both types of representation matter and lobbying efforts by public and private universities may differ. Thus this article suggests politics plays a role in diverting funding that might be given to other institutions based under a more objective process, reducing the potential effectiveness of the funding on research activities. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Other versions of this item:
- A Abigail Payne, 2001. "The Effects of Congressional Appropriation Committee Membership on the Distribution of Federal Research Funding to Universities," Public Economics 0111003, EconWPA.
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
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