Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying
AbstractIn this paper, we estimate the returns to lobbying by universities. To motivate our empirical work, we develop a simple theoretical model of university lobbying for academic earmarks. Our statistical analysis shows that universities represented by a House Appropriations Committee (HAC) or Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) member spend less money on lobbying than those that are not represented. In addition, using instrumental variables estimations, we show that universities without HAC or SAC representation may receive some benefit to lobbying for earmarks, although in many estimations this benefit is not statistically different from zero. However, for universities with HAC or SAC representation, a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2.8 percent or 3.5 percent increase in earmarks, respectively. This suggests that there are large returns to lobbying for academic earmarks if a university is represented by a member of one the HAC or SAC, but little or no return if not.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 49 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gropper, Daniel M. & Jahera, John S. & Park, Jung Chul, 2013. "Does it help to have friends in high places? Bank stock performance and congressional committee chairmanships," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1986-1999.
- Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012.
"How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose,"
111211, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-11-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
- Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2012.
"Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 18-26.
- Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2009. "Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?," NBER Working Papers 14771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kim, Jin-Hyuk, 2008.
"Corporate Lobbying Revisited,"
51396, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2013. "A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting," Discussion Papers 2013-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Gerald Carlino & Robert Hunt, 2009. "What explains the quantity and quality of local inventive activity?," Working Papers 09-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- John M. de Figueiredo, 2011. "Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 17171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bryan Engelhardt & Justin Svec, 2012. "Political Contributions and Insurance," Working Papers 1204, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
- Silke Friedrich, 2010. "Measuring Interest Group Activity," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(4), pages 37-46, 01.
- Hill, Matthew D. & Kubick, Thomas R. & Brandon Lockhart, G. & Wan, Huishan, 2013. "The effectiveness and valuation of political tax minimization," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 2836-2849.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.