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The Effects of Congressional Appropriation Committee Membership on the Distribution of Federal Research Funding to Universities

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Author Info
A Abigail Payne (University of Illinois)

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of congressional representation of a university through district representation or an alma mater affiliation on the distribution of research funding to research and doctoral universities in the United States. Because appropriations are allocated to agencies on an annual basis, Congress and agencies may be considered strategic actors that seek to minimize as well as exploit their differences in informational asymmetries. Using a data set that covers more than twenty-five years of data, I find there are strong effects from congressional representation on the distribution of research funding. These effects vary based on the type of representation, the seniority of the member serving on the committee, as well as the type of ownership of the university (private or public). Depending on the empirical specification, political diversions of research funding range between four and forty-eight percent. Surprisingly, the diversions associated with an alma mater affiliation are more robust than the diversions associated with district representation, suggesting the existence of political slack. These results suggest that informational asymmetries play a role in the level of congressional influence on agency actions. In addition, the results suggest that actions taken by members of the appropriations committees vary based on their tenure on the committees.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0111003.

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Date of creation: 05 Nov 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0111003

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Related research
Keywords: congressional representation; research funding; universities;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. A. Abigail Payne & Aloysius Siow, 1998. "Estimating the Effects of Federal Research Funding on Universities using Alumni Representation on Congressional Appropriations Committees," Working Papers siow-99-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Edward P. Lazear, 1996. "Incentives in Basic Research," NBER Working Papers 5444, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. James D. Adams & Zvi Griliches, 1998. "Research Productivity in a System of Universities," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 49-50, pages 06, Janvier-J. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Parker, Glenn R & Parker, Suzanne L, 1998. " The Economic Organization of Legislatures and How It Affects Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 117-29, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Connolly, Laura S., 1997. "Does external funding of academic research crowd out institutional support?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 389-406, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
  7. Saving, Jason L, 1997. " Human Capital, Committee Power and Legislative Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 301-16, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Frank R. Lichtenberg, 1998. "The Allocation of Publically-Funded Biomedical Research," NBER Working Papers 6601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Glenn Parker & Suzanne Parker, 1998. "The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 117-129, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1162-76, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
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  13. Goff, Brian L & Grier, Kevin B, 1993. " On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 5-20, June.
  14. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Philippe Aghion & Mathias Dewatripont & Caroline M. Hoxby & Andreu Mas-Colell & André Sapir, 2009. "The Governance and Performance of Research Universities: Evidence from Europe and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 14851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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