The Effects of Congressional Appropriation Committee Membership on the Distribution of Federal Research Funding to Universities
Does congressional representation of a university affect the distribution of research funding to universities? This article studies two types of congressional representation: district representation, reflecting interests related to the politician's constituents, and alma mater affiliation, reflecting the politician's personal interests. I find that both types of representation matter and lobbying efforts by public and private universities may differ. Thus this article suggests politics plays a role in diverting funding that might be given to other institutions based under a more objective process, reducing the potential effectiveness of the funding on research activities. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven D. Levitt & James M. Snyder, Jr., 1995.
"The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes,"
NBER Working Papers
5002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
- James D. Adams & Zvi Griliches, 1998.
"Research Productivity in a System of Universities,"
Annals of Economics and Statistics,
GENES, issue 49-50, pages 127-162.
- A. Abigail Payne & Aloysius Siow, 1998. "Estimating the Effects of Federal Research Funding on Universities using Alumni Representation on Congressional Appropriations Committees," Working Papers siow-99-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- repec:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:49-50 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
- Frank R. Lichtenberg, 1998.
"The Allocation of Publicly-Funded Biomedical Research,"
NBER Working Papers
6601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frank R. Lichtenberg, 2001. "The Allocation of Publicly Funded Biomedical Research," NBER Chapters, in: Medical Care Output and Productivity, pages 565-590 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1162-76, December.
- Glenn Parker & Suzanne Parker, 1998. "The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 117-129, April.
- Lott, John R, Jr & Bronars, Stephen G, 1993. "Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 125-49, June.
- Saving, Jason L, 1997. "Human Capital, Committee Power and Legislative Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 301-16, September.
- repec:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:49-50:p:05 is not listed on IDEAS
- Goff, Brian L & Grier, Kevin B, 1993. "On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 5-20, June.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1997.
"Incentives in Basic Research,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages S167-97, January.
- George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
- Parker, Glenn R & Parker, Suzanne L, 1998. "The Economic Organization of Legislatures and How It Affects Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 117-29, April.
- Connolly, Laura S., 1997. "Does external funding of academic research crowd out institutional support?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 389-406, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:2:p:325-345. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.