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Budget Committee And Intergovernmental Transfer: Evidence From South Korea

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  • Hyun‐A Kim
  • Dongwon Lee
  • Sangwon Park

Abstract

This paper revisits the claim that members of legislative committees direct more earmark spending to their constituents. In South Korea's legislature, a national law regulating the budget committee provides an unusual source of exogenous variation in membership: members of the committee are rotated each year owing to 1‐year term limits. Using data from 226 local governments, and both within‐district and within‐member variations in membership, we find that districts represented by a budget committee member secure roughly 3% more subsidies than those represented by a nonmember. (JEL D72, D78, H70)

Suggested Citation

  • Hyun‐A Kim & Dongwon Lee & Sangwon Park, 2020. "Budget Committee And Intergovernmental Transfer: Evidence From South Korea," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1894-1906, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:58:y:2020:i:4:p:1894-1906
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12905
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jung, Hoyong, 2022. "Voter Turnout Effects on Local Public Finance and Legislation: Evidence from South Korea," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 63(1), pages 1-23, June.
    2. Lee, Dongwon & Min, Sujin, 2023. "Participatory budgeting and the pattern of local government spending: Evidence from South Korea," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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