The Political Determination of Intergovernmental Grants in Australia
Intergovernmental grants have been conventionally explained on the basis of either equity/efficiency and/or institutional considerations. This paper seeks to model Australian intergovernmental grants by including both traditional public finance variables and public choice influences; that is, grants are used by federal government politicians to purchase political capital, thereby enhancing their own chances of reelection. The models employed in this paper are tested for six Australian states for the period 1981-82 to 1991-92 using unsystematic grant transfers. The results provide support for these public choice considerations and highlight the importance of incorporating institutional factors and controlling for misspecification in the error structure in estimates of this type. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 94 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mathews, Russell, 1985. "The Grants Commission's Relativities Proposals: A Comment," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(44), pages 214-17, June.
- P.J. Grossman, 1988.
"The Impact of Federal and State Grants on Local Government Spending: A test of the fiscal illusion hypothesis,"
Economics Discussion / Working Papers
88-07, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
- Philip J. Grossman, 1990. "The Impact of Federal and State Grants on Local Government Spending: a Test of the Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis," Public Finance Review, SAGE Publishing, vol. 18(3), pages 313-327, July.
- Philip J. Grossman, 1990. "The impact of federal and state grants on local government spending: A test of the fiscal illusion hypothesis," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Philip J, 1994.
"A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants,"
Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 295-303, March.
- Mel Bungey & Peter Kenyon & Philip J. Grossman, 1991. "Explaining intergovernmental grants: Australian evidence," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-14, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Winer, Stanley L, 1983. "Some Evidence on the Effect of the Separation of Spending and Taxing Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(1), pages 126-40, February.
- Wallis, John Joseph, 1991. "The Political Economy of New Deal Fiscal Federalism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(3), pages 510-24, July.
- Dennis Patrick Leyden, 1992. "Donor-Determined Intergovernmental Grants Structure," Public Finance Review, SAGE Publishing, vol. 20(3), pages 321-337, July.
- Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G, 1981.
"Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses,"
Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 781-93, May.
- Russell Davidson & James G. MacKinnon, 1980. "Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses," Working Papers 378, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February.
- Hammes, David L & Wills, Douglas T, 1987. "Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government in Canada," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 707-13, October.
- Logan, Robert R, 1986. "Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1304-18, December.
- Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Schimmelpfenning, Jorg, 1992. "Closeness Counts If It Matters for Electoral Victory: Some Empirical Results for the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 283-99, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:3-4:p:299-315. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.