Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Russell S. Sobel & Matt Ryan, 2009. "Seniority and Anti-competitive Restrictions on the Legislative Common Pool: Tenure’s Impact on the Overall Production of Legislation and the Concentration of Political Benefits," Working Papers 09-11, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
- Levitt, Steven D & Poterba, James M, 1999.
"Congressional Distributive Politics and State Economic Performance,"
Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 185-216, April.
- Steven D. Levitt & James M. Poterba, 1994. "Congressional Distributive Politics and State Economic Performance," NBER Working Papers 4721, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Holcombe, Randall G, 1999. "Veterans Interests and the Transition to Government Growth: 1870-1915," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 311-326, June.
- Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1985. "Legislation and Political Business Cycles," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 43-59.
- Parker, Glenn R, 1992. "The Distribution of Honoraria Income in the U.S. Congress: Who Gets Rents in Legislatures and Why?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 167-181, March.
- Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
- Holcombe, Randall G & Parker, Glenn R, 1991. "Committees in Legislatures: A Property Rights Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(1), pages 11-20, April.
- Arleen Leibowitz & Robert Tollison, 1980. "A Theory of Legislative Organization: Making the Most of Your Majority," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 261-277.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:01:p:89-106_18 is not listed on IDEAS
- McCormick, Robert E & Tollison, Robert D, 1978. "Legislatures as Unions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(1), pages 63-78, February.
- Crain, W Mark, 1977. "On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(4), pages 829-842, August.
- William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
- Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eiji Yamamura, 2016.
"Governors’ term of office and information disclosure: Evidence from Japan,"
Journal of Economics and Econometrics,
Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 59(1), pages 48-78.
- Eiji Yamamura, 2016. "Governors’ term of office and information disclosure: Evidence from Japan," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2016/06, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
- Yamamura, Eiji, 2013. "Governor’s term and information disclosure: Evidence from Japan," MPRA Paper 45848, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsSeniority; Tenure; Industrial organization of Congress; Legislative behavior;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:1:p:171-190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .