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Testing Models of Distributive Politics using Exit Polls to Measure Voters’ Preferences and Partisanship

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  • Larcinese, Valentino
  • Snyder, James M.
  • Testa, Cecilia

Abstract

This article tests several hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distribution of federal spending across US states over the period 1978–2002. It improves on previous work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that are Democrats, Republicans and Independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. No evidence is found that the allocation of federal spending to the states is distorted by strategic manipulation to win electoral support. States with many swing voters are not advantaged compared to states with more loyal voters, and ‘battleground states’ are not advantaged compared to other states. Spending appears to have little or no effect on voters’ choices, while partisanship and ideology have large effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Larcinese, Valentino & Snyder, James M. & Testa, Cecilia, 2013. "Testing Models of Distributive Politics using Exit Polls to Measure Voters’ Preferences and Partisanship," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 845-875, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:43:y:2013:i:04:p:845-875_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Gregor, András, 2020. "Intergovernmental transfers and political competition measured by pivotal probability - Evidence from Hungary," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    2. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "The size and scope of government in the US states: does party ideology matter?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(4), pages 687-714, August.
    3. Roberto Bonfatti & Giovanni Facchini & Alexander Tarasov & Gian Luca Tedeschi & Cecilia Testa, 2021. "Pork, infrastructure and growth: Evidence from the Italian railway expansion," Discussion Papers 2021-04, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    4. Gonschorek, Gerrit J. & Schulze, Günther G. & Sjahrir, Bambang Suharnoko, 2018. "To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 240-260.
    5. Dario Debowicz & Alejandro Saporiti & Yizhi Wang, 2021. "Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 197-228, August.
    6. Kuriwaki, Shiro, 2020. "A Clustering Approach for Characterizing Voter Types: An Application to High-Dimensional Ballot and Survey Data," OSF Preprints v3rhz, Center for Open Science.
    7. Minh T. Le & Alejandro Saporiti & Yizhi Wang, 2021. "Distributive politics with other‐regarding preferences," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(2), pages 203-227, April.
    8. Puscas, Georgiana, 2021. "When does the winner take more? The role of political alignment in transfers to Romanian municipalities," Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers 05, Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers.
    9. Nicola Mastrorocco, 2018. "Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources," Trinity Economics Papers tep1018, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    10. Konstantinos Matakos & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "When extremes meet: Redistribution in a multiparty model with differentiated parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 546-577, October.
    11. Rhode, Paul W. & Snyder, Jr., James M. & Strumpf, Koleman, 2018. "The arsenal of democracy: Production and politics during WWII," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 145-161.
    12. Hill, Andrew J. & Jones, Daniel B., 2017. "Does partisan affiliation impact the distribution of spending? Evidence from state governments’ expenditures on education," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 58-77.
    13. Jean-Francois Maystadt & Muhammad Kabir Salihu, 2015. "National or political cake?," Working Papers 100756558, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    14. Ilya A. Vaskin, 2020. "Buying Loyalty Of Voters Or Local Elites? Political Alignment And Transfers To Provinces In Tutelary Regimes: The Case Of Iran," HSE Working papers WP BRP 73/PS/2020, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    15. Luisa Schneider & Daniela Wech & Matthias Wrede, 2022. "Political alignment and project funding," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(6), pages 1561-1589, December.
    16. Verena Kroth & Valentino Larcinese & Joachim Wehner, 2016. "A Better Life for All? Democratization and Electrification in Post-Apartheid South Africa," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 60, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.

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