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Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage

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  • Johnston, Michael

Abstract

How are patronage rewards allocated within a political machine? This article studies the distribution of 675 CETA Title I jobs within a New Haven machine. Data suggest that the jobs were used as patronage, but that patronage allocations did not follow conventionally assumed patterns of organization maintenance. Ethnic particularism overshadowed, and in fact redefined, considerations of vote-maximization and recruitment of workers. Questionnaire data suggest that those hired were not highly active politically, either before or after hiring, a finding contrary to normal suppositions about patronage recipients. The seemingly anomalous (and perhaps even counterproductive) patronage allocations become understandable, however, viewed in light of some problems and contradictions inherent in patron-client politics. These involve the inflexibility of job-based incentive systems, qualifications on assumptions of reciprocity, and the “aging†of the organization.

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  • Johnston, Michael, 1979. "Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 385-398, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:73:y:1979:i:02:p:385-398_16
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria C. Lo Bue & Kunal Sen & Staffan I. Lindberg, 2021. "Clientelism, public goods provision, and governance," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-98, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Li, Weijia & Roland, Gérard & Xie, Yang, 2020. "Erosion of state power, corruption control, and political stability," BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2020, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    3. Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006. "Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    4. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaee, Arman, 2023. "The political economy of public sector absence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    5. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir, 2016. "The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan," CEPR Discussion Papers 11321, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Farida, Mohamad & Ahmadi-Esfahani, Fredoun Z., 2006. "Corruption and economic development: A critical review of literature," 2006 Conference (50th), February 8-10, 2006, Sydney, Australia 139727, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    7. Michael Johnston, 2000. "Corruption et démocratie : menaces pour le développement, possibilités de réforme," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(161), pages 117-142.
    8. Li, Weijia & Roland, Gérard & Xie, Yang, 2020. "Erosion of state power, corruption control, and political stability," BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2020, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    9. repec:zbw:bofitp:2020_005 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Kathleen A. Kemp, 1986. "Race, Ethnicity, Class and Urban Spatial Conflict: Chicago as a Crucial Test Case," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 23(3), pages 197-208, June.
    11. Daniel Kaufmann & Massimo Mastruzzi & Diego Zavaleta, 2003. "Sustained Macroeconomic Reforms, Tepid Growth: A Governance Puzzle in Bolivia?," Development and Comp Systems 0308003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. V. Vijayalakshmi, 2006. "Corruption and Local Governance: Evidence from Karnataka," Working Papers id:311, eSocialSciences.

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