IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina


  • Alberto Porto
  • Pablo Sanguinetti


This paper explores the determinants of federal grants allocation across provincial states in Argentina. Our analysis suggests that the redistributive pattern implicit in the federal system of intergovernmental grants cannot be explained on normative grounds exclusively. In order to understand the rationale behind federal grants distribution, a positive approach could render better results. Specifically, we claim that the distribution of federal grants could be associated with political variables such as the political representation of jurisdictions at Congress. The econometric analysis suggests that the significant disparity observed in the per capita representation across different provinces is an important factor explaining the allocation of those transfers. In this respect, overrepresented provinces, both at the senate and at the lower chamber, have received, on average, higher resources from the national government compared to more populous and less represented states. These results are consistent with those observed in other countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Porto & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 237-256, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:237-256
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00092

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:237-256. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley Content Delivery). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.