Constitutent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost
AbstractThis paper applies the economic model of legislative voting to the automobile industry domestic content vote in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1982. The authors consider constituent interests for and against the bill, and compare the predictive powers of alternative indicators of ideological preferences. They also examine the role of political opportunity cost and find that lame ducks were significantly less likely to vote for the bill than were returnees to Congress. Given the political advanta ges of voting for the bill, this is consistent with the view that leg islators were influenced by the case for freer trade. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 26 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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