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Constitutent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost

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  • McArthur, John
  • Marks, Stephen V
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    Abstract

    This paper applies the economic model of legislative voting to the automobile industry domestic content vote in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1982. The authors consider constituent interests for and against the bill, and compare the predictive powers of alternative indicators of ideological preferences. They also examine the role of political opportunity cost and find that lame ducks were significantly less likely to vote for the bill than were returnees to Congress. Given the political advanta ges of voting for the bill, this is consistent with the view that leg islators were influenced by the case for freer trade. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

    Volume (Year): 26 (1988)
    Issue (Month): 3 (July)
    Pages: 461-70

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:26:y:1988:i:3:p:461-70

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    Cited by:
    1. William Kaempfer & Thomas Willett, 1989. "Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 79-86, October.
    2. Timothy Besley & Valentino Larcinese, 2005. "Working or Shirking?A Closer Look at MPs’ Expenses and Parliamentary Attendance," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 15, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    3. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73373, Tilburg University.
    4. Baban Hasnat & Charles Callahan, III, 2004. "The Determinants of US Congressional Voting on the Trade and Development Act of 2000," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 3(1), pages 35-44, April.
    5. Dennis, Christopher & Medoff, Marshall H. & Magnera, Michael, 2008. "Constituents' economic interests and senator support for spending limitations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2443-2453, December.
    6. Binswanger, Johannes & Prüfer, Jens, 2012. "Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 358-372.
    7. Lowell Johnson, 1997. "The Lighthouse Reform Movement in Antebellum America," Departmental Working Papers 199703, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    8. Kevin Henrickson & Wesley Wilson, 2013. "Voting, Regulation, and the Railroad Industry: An Analysis of Private and Public Interest Voting Patterns," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 21-39, August.

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