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Individualism and Political Disorder

Author

Listed:
  • James M. Buchanan
  • Yong J. Yoon

Abstract

Inspired by F.A. Hayek’s Individualism and Economic Order, this book also stands in contrast to the themes of that work, by emphasizing that collective action works differently from the way the market works. The chapters comprise papers written by James M.Buchanan, both with and without Yoon’s co-authorship, after the publication of his Collected Work volumes. These chapters reflect the authors' thoughts on politics, seen through the lens of fiscal policy and the tragedies of the commons and anti-commons in collective action. The pathologies of democratic politics rigorously analyzed in the book prove the relevance of Buchanan's constitutionalism

Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab

Suggested Citation

  • James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, 2015. "Individualism and Political Disorder," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16046.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:16046
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ross B. Emmett, 2020. "James M. Buchanan and Frank H. Knight on democracy as “government by discussion”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 303-314, June.
    2. Yong J. Yoon, 2017. "Buchanan on increasing returns and anticommons," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 270-285, September.
    3. Randall G. Holcombe, 2020. "James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 371-387, June.

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