This paper develops and expanded framework for social planning in which coercion stemming from the provision of public goods is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion, its difference from redistribtion, and its incorporation into social welfare optimization. The paper examines the implications for optimal policy, showing how the Samuelson condition, rules for optimal linear income taxation and commodity taxation, and for the marginal cost of public funds must be modified. In addition, the trade-off between social welface and coercion is mapped under specific conditions and the implications of this trade-off for normative policy choice are considered.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number
07-03.
Length: 43 pages Date of creation: 27 Jan 2007 Date of revision: Publication status: Published: Carleton Economic Paper Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:07-03
Contact details of provider: Postal: 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa Ontario, K1S 5B6 Canada Phone: 1-613-520-3744 Fax: 1-613-520-3906
Order Information: Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Meghan Gaudet).
Related research
Keywords:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
David E. Wildasin, 2005.
"Fiscal Competition,"
Working Papers
2005-05, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
[Downloadable!]