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Standing on the Shoulders of Giants or Science? – Lessons from Ordoliberalism

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  • Lars P. Feld
  • Ekkehard A. Köhler

Abstract

James Buchanan would have celebrated his 100th birthday in 2019. This serves as an inspiration to look at the future of public choice and the question of how much normativity public choice can bear. In our analysis we draw parallels between public choice and German ordoliberalism (and its source in the Freiburg School of Economics). We argue that the reception of ordoliberalism exemplifies easy-to-grasp pitfalls that should be taken seriously. We anchor the future agenda of public choice in a solid individualist perspective. Similar to ordoliberalism, public choice will have to clarify its relation to normative economics. The effects of rules and institutions and their working properties should be thoroughly analyzed empirically. The role of ideas is important for the normative foundation of both public choice/ constitutional economics and ordoliberalism, and is rooted in normative individualism. It provides a benchmark by which rules and institutions can be judged as favorable.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars P. Feld & Ekkehard A. Köhler, 2023. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants or Science? – Lessons from Ordoliberalism," CESifo Working Paper Series 10382, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10382
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    Cited by:

    1. Dold, Malte & Krieger, Tim, 2024. "Market democracy, rising populism, and contemporary ordoliberalism," Discussion Paper Series 2024-01, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public choice; methodology; James Buchanan; normativity; individualism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
    • B26 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Financial Economics
    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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