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Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy

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Author Info
VANBERG, VIKTOR J.
Abstract

The paper approaches the market versus state issue from the perspective of constitutional political economy, a research program that has been advanced as a principal alternative to traditional welfare economics and its perspective on the relation between market and state. Constitutional political economy looks at market and state as different kinds of social arenas in which people may realize mutual gains from voluntary exchange and cooperation. The working properties of these arenas depend on their respective constitutions, i.e. the rules of the game that define the constraints under which individuals are allowed, in either arena, to pursue their interests. It is argued that improving markets means to adopt and to maintain an economic constitution that enhances consumer sovereignty, and that improvement in the political arena means to adopt and to maintain constitutional rules that enhance citizen sovereignty.

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File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1744137405000032
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Journal of Institutional Economics.

Volume (Year): 1 (2005)
Issue (Month): 01 (June)
Pages: 23-49
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:1:y:2005:i:01:p:23-49_00

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  1. Ulrich Witt & Christian Schubert, 2008. "Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 203-225, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Peter Leeson, 2009. "The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 443-459, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Viktor Vanberg, 2007. "Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 199-222, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.


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