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Tax Policy From a Public Choice Perspective

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  • Holcombe, Randall G.

Abstract

Tax policy is a product of politics, so a complete understanding of tax policy requires an explicit recognition of the political environment within which tax policy is made. The paper emphasizes the concept of political costs associated with the tax system and discusses several aspects of tax policy using a public choice approach. The paper argues that the political costs associated with taxation can be minimized by embedding the tax system within a relatively inflexible fiscal constitution. Despite the insights the public choice perspective offers, most analysis of tax policy does not take public choice considerations into account.

Suggested Citation

  • Holcombe, Randall G., 1998. "Tax Policy From a Public Choice Perspective," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(2), pages 359-371, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:51:y:1998:i:2:p:359-71
    DOI: 10.1086/NTJ41789332
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    Cited by:

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    2. Raffaella Santolini, 2009. "The political trend in local government tax setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 125-134, April.
    3. Randall G. Holcombe, 2002. "The Ramsey Rule Reconsidered," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(6), pages 562-578, November.
    4. Richard E. Wagner, 2012. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14477.
    5. Jason Shumberger & Akheil Singla, 2022. "Are tax and expenditure limitations constraining institutions or institutionally irrelevant? Evidence from Minnesota," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 3-33, December.
    6. Charles Delmotte, 2021. "Simple rules and the Political Economy of Income Taxation: the strengths of a uniform expense rule," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 323-339, December.
    7. Russell S. Sobel & John A. Dove, 2016. "Analyzing the Effectiveness of State Regulatory Review," Public Finance Review, , vol. 44(4), pages 446-477, July.
    8. J. Brandon Bolen & Russell S. Sobel, 2020. "Does Balance Among Areas of Institutional Quality Matter for Economic Growth?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1418-1445, April.
    9. repec:pri:cepsud:80rosen is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Harvey S. Rosen, 2002. "Public Finance: Essay for the Encyclopedia of Public Choice," Working Papers 122, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    11. Douglas M. Walker & John D. Jackson, 2008. "Do U.S. Gambling Industries Cannibalize Each Other?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(3), pages 308-333, May.
    12. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-221, December.
    13. Cosgel, Metin M., 2006. "Taxes, efficiency, and redistribution: Discriminatory taxation of villages in Ottoman Palestine, Southern Syria, and Transjordan in the sixteenth century," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 332-356, April.
    14. Harvey S. Rosen, 2002. "Public Finance: Essay for the Encyclopedia of Public Choice," Working Papers 122, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    15. Jody W. Lipford, 2022. "The Distribution of Transfers and Taxes: Incentives and Implications for the US Deficit and Debt," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 37(Winter 20), pages 1-20.

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