The Political Efficiency of General Taxation
AbstractArgues that unconstrained legislative majorities overtax political minorities and proposes that a general principle of a uniform, proportional rate of tax be applied at all income levels.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by National Tax Association in its journal National Tax Journal.
Volume (Year): 46 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Spicer, Michael W., 1995. "On Friedrich Hayek and Taxation: Rationality, Rules, and Majority Rule," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(1), pages 103-12, March.
- Poterba, James M., 1998. "Public Finance and Public Choice," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 2), pages 391-96, June.
- Niclas Berggren, 1999. "A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 339-353, November.
- Holcombe, Randall G., 1998.
"Tax Policy From a Public Choice Perspective,"
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National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 2), pages 359-71, June.
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