IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v6y1994i2p189-216.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation

Author

Listed:
  • Charlotte Twight

Abstract

This article shows linkages between a broadened transaction-cost theory of politics and prior studies analyzing governmental behavior such as agenda control, strategic use of information, cost concealment and cost dispersion. It develops a model of government manipulation of politically relevant transaction costs in order to facilitate both more comprehensive specification of the determinants of such political behavior and more accurate assessment of the likelihood and consequences of institutional change. The article presents a taxonomy that classifies conceptually various observed and potential forms of governmental transaction-cost manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Charlotte Twight, 1994. "Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(2), pages 189-216, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:2:p:189-216
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006002003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951692894006002003
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951692894006002003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fiorina, Morris P & Noll, Roger G, 1978. "Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design in the Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 256-260, May.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, 1990. "The Politics of Ambiguity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(4), pages 829-850.
    3. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic theory and the welfare state : a survey and interpretation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 279, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. John R. Lott, Jr., 1987. "Why Is Education Publicly Provided? A Critical Survey," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 7(2), pages 475-501, Fall.
    5. Richard A. Posner, 1971. "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 22-50, Spring.
    6. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    7. Mack Ott, 1981. "Bureaucratic Incentives, Social Efficiency, and the Conflict in Federal Land Policy," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 1(2), pages 585-607, Fall.
    8. Crew, Michael A & Twight, Charlotte, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 15-36, July.
    9. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    10. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    11. Charlotte Twight, 1990. "Regulation Of Asbestos The Microana1ytics Of Government Failure," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 10(1), pages 9-39, September.
    12. Charlotte Twight, 1992. "Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 89-112, December.
    13. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    14. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    15. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-388, September.
    16. Twight, Charlotte, 1991. "From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame: The Evolution of Congressional Strategy for Asbestos Management," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 153-186, April.
    17. Carolyn L. Weaver, 1983. "The Economics and Politics of the Emergence of Social Security: Some Implications for Reform.," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 3(2), pages 361-391, Fall.
    18. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    19. Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1978. "The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 245-257, April.
    20. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 741-803, June.
    21. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 85-104, March.
    22. Weaver, R. Kent, 1986. "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 371-398, October.
    23. Charlotte Twight, 1993. "Channeling Ideological Change: The Political Economy of Dependence on Government," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 497-527, November.
    24. Austen-Smith, David & Riker, William H., 1990. "Asymmetric Information and The Coherence of Legislation: A Correction," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 243-245, March.
    25. E. West & Stanley Winer, 1980. "Optimal fiscal illusion and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(5), pages 607-622, January.
    26. Bendor, Jonathan & Taylor, Serge & Gaalen, Roland Van, 1985. "Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 1041-1060, December.
    27. -, 1986. "Agenda = Agenda," Series Históricas 8749, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    28. Austen-Smith, David & Riker, William H., 1987. "Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 897-918, September.
    29. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    30. Lott, John R, Jr, 1990. "An Explanation for Public Provision of Schooling: The Importance of Indoctrination," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 199-231, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Twight, Charlotte, 1996. "Federal control over education: Crisis, deception, and institutional change," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 299-333, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Twight, Charlotte, 1996. "Federal control over education: Crisis, deception, and institutional change," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 299-333, December.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    3. Charlotte Twight, 1992. "Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 89-112, December.
    4. Stavins, Robert & Keohane, Nathaniel & Revesz, Richard, 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-25, Resources for the Future.
    5. Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
    6. Anders Gustafsson, 2019. "Busy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 282-299, September.
    7. William C. Mitchell, 1990. "Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 85-108, January.
    8. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
    9. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The economics and politics of financial modernization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 25-37.
    10. Edwyna Harris, 2008. "Colonialism And Long‐Run Growth In Australia: An Examination Of Institutional Change In Victoria'S Water Sector During The Nineteenth Century," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 48(3), pages 266-279, November.
    11. Aidt, Toke S. & Eterovic, Dalibor S., 2011. "Political competition, electoral participation and public finance in 20th century Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 181-200, March.
    12. Felgendreher, Simon & Lehmann, Paul, 2012. "The political economy of the peruvian urban water sector," UFZ Discussion Papers 18/2012, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
    13. Rojas Rivera, Angela Milena & Molina Guerra, Carlos A., 2015. "A Comparative Analysis of Political Competition and Local Provision of Public Goods: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico(1991-2010)," MPRA Paper 67383, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Oct 2015.
    14. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    15. David Hollanders & Barbara Vis, 2013. "Voters’ commitment problem and reforms in welfare programs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 433-448, June.
    16. Kenneth A. Shepsle, 1989. "Studying Institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(2), pages 131-147, April.
    17. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    18. Charlotte Twight, 1988. "Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 131-152, February.
    19. Randall Holcombe, 2005. "Government growth in the twenty-first century," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 95-114, July.
    20. Randall G. Holcombe & Jeffrey A. Mills, 1994. "Is Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform Revenue Neutral?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(1), pages 65-85, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:2:p:189-216. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.