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Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting

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  • Peter Coughlin

Abstract

This paper studies the Pareto optimality properties of policy proposals and electoral outcomes when there is probabilistic voting. Theorem 1 proves that, when the position of one candidate is taken as fixed, the other candidate will propose a Pareto optimal alternative. This implies that whenever there is an electoral equilibrium (in pure strategies) the electoral outcome is Pareto optimal. It also implies that, even if there is no such equilibrium, the electoral outcomes from a sequence of elections will be Pareto optimal (except, possibly, for an initial status quo). Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Coughlin, 1982. "Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 427-433, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:39:y:1982:i:3:p:427-433
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00118799
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    Cited by:

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    2. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    3. Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
    4. Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 35-48, April.
    5. Dennis Mueller, 1986. "Rational egoism versus adaptive egoism as fundamental postulate for a descriptive theory of human behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 3-23, January.
    6. repec:esx:essedp:751 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. David Juárez-Luna & Christian Ghiglino, 2014. "Elite capture of democratic politics: the role of social identity," Working papers DTE 573, CIDE, División de Economía.
    8. Andreas Oestreicher & Reinald Koch, 2011. "The Revenue Consequences of Using a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base to Determine Taxable Income in the EU Member States," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 67(1), pages 64-102, March.
    9. Hannu Nurmi, 1993. "Problems in the Theory of Institutional Design," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(4), pages 523-540, October.
    10. John Ledyard, 1984. "The pure theory of large two-candidate elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 7-41, January.
    11. ,, 2014. "A dynamic theory of electoral competition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    12. Sangwon Park, 2013. "Separation of Two Agencies for Fiscal Policies," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 29, pages 351-377.
    13. Jason Bell & Joel Huber & W. Kip Viscusi, 2009. "Voter-weighted environmental preferences," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 655-671.
    14. Geoffrey Brennan, 1994. "Public economics: Where are we now?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(2), pages 183-188, October.
    15. Nurmi, Hannu & Kacprzyk, Janusz & Fedrizzi, Mario, 1996. "Probabilistic, fuzzy and rough concepts in social choice," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 264-277, December.
    16. Tanner, Thomas Cole, 1994. "The spatial theory of elections: an analysis of voters' predictive dimensions and recovery of the underlying issue space," ISU General Staff Papers 1994010108000018174, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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