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Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter?

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  • Ando, Amy Whritenour

Abstract

This paper uses duration analysis to evaluate the ability of interest groups to influence the timing of decisions to add species to the endangered species list by exerting pressure on the Fish and Wildlife Service. Using data from 1990 to 1994, it finds that public opposition and support can substantially slow and hasten (respectively) the progress of candidate species through the parts of the listing process most directly under the agency's control. Since the Service is not an atypical agency, similar patterns of public influence on delay may exist in other areas of bureaucratic decision making as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Ando, Amy Whritenour, 1999. "Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter?," Discussion Papers 10564, Resources for the Future.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:rffdps:10564
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10564
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    Cited by:

    1. Rondeau, Daniel, 2001. "Along the Way Back from the Brink," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 156-182, September.
    2. Michael R. Moore & Elizabeth B. Maclin & David W. Kershner, 2001. "Testing Theories of Agency Behavior: Evidence from Hydropower Project Relicensing Decisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(3), pages 423-442.
    3. Ando, Amy Whritenour, 1998. "Do Interest Groups Compete?," Discussion Papers 10732, Resources for the Future.

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    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

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